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Quo Vadis Latin America? (PartDois)
by Jose'M. Barrionuevo*

Latin American political trends have changed markedly over the last
three years. Many countries are now looking for radical change to address longstanding poverty, rising unemployment, and what is perceived to be the failed
promises of prosperity that liberal economics was thought to bring. The new
choices that Latin Americans are making appear more like a cry of frustration,
rather than an ultimate answer. Most of the governments now being replaced
portrayed a new era of sound macroeconomic policies and open markets that
was to help Latin America grow out of poverty during the 1990s. Not
surprisingly, the failure of these governments has been tied to the failure of
markets and neoclassical policies that were bound to bring an oasis of
prosperity. Ironically, as soon as the new "radicals" take office, they realize that
the room to bring the promised change in the election is over with the election
itself. In most countries, their ability to persuade congresses or to flesh out
change for the better is much lower than most thought it would be. This has
paved the way for the incredible degree of incompetence that rambles through
Latin America these days and has actually worsened economic conditions. In
extreme cases, such as Venezuela or Argentina, the collapse of the private
economy is the result of the ignorant belief that the country can grow without its
private businesses or the belief that breaking property rights and most contracts
would magically put the country in a new growth era.
The idea that change is needed because sharp market policies and
reforms have failed Latin America is flawed. In fact, Latin America's real
problem is that little has changed and that the failure to break with the past is the
reason crises continue to deepen. In fact, the so-called pro-reform governments
consistently break the deeply entrenched interest groups that for decades have
been so successful to prevent change in the structures of Latin economies.
Without structural changes, Latin American growth is bound to remain weak,
barring the usual cyclical U.S. pullout that results in brief periods of growth.
Interest groups run from the old-fashioned businesses, that are not willing or
*The author is the Director of Emerging Market Research at Barclays Capital. This paper was
originally published by Barclays Capital as an internal publication in November 6, 2002. The
sources used in preparation of this article are the internal sources of Barclays Capital and are
available with the author.
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able to compete, to the politicians, that represent the interest of businesses or
"prominent families" in Congress that also have family members running many
things, from state offices to hospitals, etc. In this sense, as it's fairly well known,
corruption remains a crucial problem. The fact that these interest groups can
prevent a nation from achieving the solutions that many times are obvious to
most people suggests, of course, that Latin American nascent democracies still
fail to represent the interests of the population as a whole. This does not mean
that elections do not represent the will of the population, which they do, but
rather that politicians once in office are either captive to a system that fails to
bring change or they become embedded in the agenda of interests groups. A
Brazilian Congressman put it well a few months ago when he said "Power is like
a violin, you take it with your left hand, but play it with your right."
The initial excitement surrounding the perceived pro-market policies
and the success of Latin America in the first half of the 1990s had to do mainly
with the ability of every country to conquer inflation and, more importantly,
with the idea that inflation needed to stay low to have a chance of strengthening
investment and growth. Remarkably, this idea was new at the time. Even in the
early 1980s in Mexico, late 1980s in Argentina, and early 1990s in Brazil,
rampant inflation was the norm of the day, with some governments even stating,
as former President Josd Lopez Portillo of Mexico did, "[w]e will grow with
inflation." Of course, growth and inflation are not compatible. To this day, this
has been the remarkable turnaround of Latin America. Beyond inflation, some
of the so-called first generation structural reforms were pursued, but the most
critical reforms were never sought because governments were never able to
break the deeply entrenched interest groups, which of course made every effort
to preserve their practices.
After decades of high inflation and growing income disparities and
poverty, the "lost" decade of the 1980s led many to realize that with inflation
and without foreign investment, growth would never pick up. There was also a
clear realization that the state could never replace the private actions of firms
and individuals in building an engine of growth. Conquering inflation thus
became a sharp, political platform that was incredibly appealing and popular for
a simple reason: lowering inflation benefits everyone and no one has to pay for
it. There are, therefore, no choices to be made and everyone becomes happier.
This was the most important success of the 1990s that extends to this day. It is,
therefore, not surprising that today inflation is the greatest threat to the future of
politicians in Latin America. This goes for every nation from Argentina and
Venezuela to Colombia and Brazil. Not surprisingly, low inflation is the greatest
legacy of the 1990s that the new democracies in Latin America are trying to
preserve everywhere. The challenge is also, of course, to keep inflation low. As
Argentina and Venezuela are beginning to witness, keeping inflation low will
come down to whether sharper structural reforms are pursued.
So what went wrong? The perception that Latin America was
successful in adjusting is flawed, despite some progress. All Latin American
countries were successful in pursuing sharp stabilization policies, which
controlled fiscal and monetary policies, bringing down inflation. The success of
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macro policies was largely due to the fact that the new efforts coincided with the
liberalization of capital flows and financial globalization. This benefited
everyone since globalization allowed for capital inflows that boosted growth,
making the idea of modernizing politically appealing. Modernization worked
because it brought growth. In fact, the closed economy feature of Latin America
during the 1970s and 1980s explained the past boom and bust cycles, as
governments sought to bring inflation down. But with no credit inflows, weak
growth improvements followed by unemployment pressures derailed adjustment
efforts usually a year or two later. The bottom line is that capital inflows and
indeed globalization made it easier to pursue tighter macroeconomic policies
and some reforms as it pushed countries into virtuous cycles. That gave
reformists and neoclassical economists a new crowd in Latin America because
the whole notion of accelerating growth prospects by attracting enormous
private capital inflows, compared to multilateral handouts, became appealing for
politicians. Financial liberalization and the new success stories meant sharp
capital inflows. The financial inflows themselves were not the problem. The
issue was the market imperfections and lack of reforms to ensure that financial
inflows would find their way to the productive investments, which are pursued
by foreign direct investment. In a world with no imperfections, of course,
whether you invest $1 in the stock of a firm or you put it to work directly would
be irrelevant if you had the same know-how and marginal efficiency of that
firm. Further, governments found a new source of financing that defer
adjustments into the future because financing resulted in the standard timeinconsistency problem. Because inflows financed current consumption rather
than investments, financial pressures were bound to re-emerge in many
countries.
Many Latin American countries were also successful in pursuing some
so-called first-generation reforms. Notable among them were basic fiscal
reforms that gave the second important boost to private businesses as trade
barriers were dismantled, public businesses (once private) were re-privatized,
capital flows were freed, and essential fiscal reforms were pursued to "ease" the
burden of the state on businesses and citizens. However, very few Latin
American countries went on to pursue successful social security reforms,
including pension and health reforms, and even fewer have pursued labor and
other political and legal reforms. Chile is to this day the only country that early
on sought to change the structure of its economy in a meaningful way.
The failure to pursue structural reforms was straightforward. When
inflation goes down, everyone benefits but when structural reforms are pursued,
you need to choose who pays for what and who is not going to get whatever they
were getting before. Everyone is for reform as long as someone else pays for it.
This is where leadership becomes an extraordinary asset. Fear and ignorance
play a role here since, in their quest to not adjust, interest groups appeal to illconceived nationalistic ideas that range from selling out the country to threats of
massive unemployment. Ironically, interest groups favor privatizations that they
don't control because poorly conceived privatization processes offer an
opportunity for profit or for controlling new interests. Not surprisingly,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

3

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

privatizations were pursued with many irregularities in most countries. This
means that, far from improving efficiency, control just changes hands in what
remains inefficient and, in most instances, uncompetitive environments. Trade
is also favored because consumers have limited choices and the perceived loss in
competitiveness due to foreign competition is offset by the access to new and
better products and inputs that help local firms compete.
More importantly, essentially no Latin American country has pursued a
political reform that balances power effectively between the three branches of
government and brings an improved judicial and legal framework. Typically,
the Executive branch is a hostage of Congress when it chooses to pursue major
structural reforms or of the Supreme Court (as Argentina has seen for years) that
derails without notice the actions of the Executive or Congress or both. This is
also the reason why a fiscal responsibility law typically does not reassure
anyone that things can change. Having an independent and competent legal
system remains one of the most underestimated changes or reforms that Latin
America badly needs. In brief, the lack of institutional features, combined with
an "individual dependent" regime, whether for better or worse, results in the
stop and go choices that characterize investment. Further, it perpetuates the
"good regimes" booms and the "bad regimes" busts that characterize Latin
America. Not surprisingly, in such a dynamic there is no such thing as the long
or even medium run. The stop and go feature of Latin America introduces a
sizable risk premium that only allows for highly profitable, short-run
(speculative) investment opportunities. Nowhere is this clearer than in
Argentina as a two-day President and a flawed legal system showed when the
country defaulted on its market, bonded debt. On the other hand, in most
countries, the "legal" and "judicial" regimes are so outdated that citizens pursue
"common sense" practices outside the formal law. Mexico is a good example of
this. Marred in outdated laws, Mexico's legislation restricts many investments
and allows for outdated labor laws. Labor practices, however, are much more
flexible because of the unpopularity of usually corrupt labor unions and thus the
implied easiness to strike agreements with the surviving unions. "Not being
legal," however, is still a major drag because it makes the firms and the workers
vulnerable to changes in the regime or leader. Further, it limits the legal
recourse that firms have and, in doing so, prevents the development of property
rights that would encourage investment. At best, legal loopholes drag the
process for too long, further increasing transaction costs.
The perceived view that Argentina was an innocent bystander of a cruel
world, as it actually adjusted through most of the 1990s, especially in 2001
heading into the crisis, is flawed. Looking at Brazil, as well, one can conclude
that many key reforms are still needed. In the end, all of these Latin American
countries as examples will lead us to conclude that it is not realistic to pursue
"long-lasting" economic reforms of any kind if sharp political and legal forms
do not precede them.
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